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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The growth of Internet and broadband shook the business and 
policy world. Many firms and industries (retailers, publishers, and so 
on) went out of business or substantially altered their business models 
due to the Internet. It also created new businesses, rapid innovation, 
and spurred entry of new firms, such as Amazon, Google, and 
Facebook. However, the growth of the Internet highlighted the 
challenges of existing laws and regulations. Individuals, firms, and 
even nation states had new openings to take on challenges they could 
not previously have undertaken. But they were also exposed to new 
vulnerabilities. Information Security and privacy is the most 
prominent challenge which can be directly attributed to the growth of 
computing and network infrastructure. As firms and individuals 
opened their networks by connecting to the outside world via a mostly 
public Internet, the ability of malicious actors to intrude into these 
networks and access restricted data and resources also increased 
exponentially. These actors routinely exploited weaknesses in firms’ 
networks, widely used Internet protocols, and various software and 
operating systems. Even ignorance or negligence on the part of non-
malicious actors had significantly larger consequences than before. 
The challenges of managing Information Security are well 
documented, and they are not just limited to firms and individuals. 
Even nation states are actively participating in attacking and 
defending their respective infrastructures. The lack of security led to 
the growth of a billion dollar industry with a variety of firms providing 
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security products and services. It also highlighted the limitations of 
our policy-making and laws. A variety of new laws concerning 
cyberspace have either been enacted (regarding, for example, Internet 
fraud, spam, data breaches, and intellectual property)1 or are being 
widely debated on Capitol Hill (pertaining to such subjects as liability 
for software designers and Internet service providers, vulnerability 
trades and disclosures, and information sharing).2 
 A second development which followed the growth of the Internet 
and computing is what is currently termed as Big Data. As users 
increasingly rely on the Internet for most daily activities from search, 
to commerce, to social interactions, firms found opportunities to 
monitor and collect user navigation patterns on the Internet. Firms 
now can store details of online user behavior on increasingly cheap 
media and apply sophisticated algorithms on powerful servers to 
create products, services, and customer experiences which are highly 
personalized. Even more importantly, firms can now target and reach 
a customer by inferring their preferences from the Internet traces they 
are leaving behind and offer them precise products, services, and 
advertisements. Firms like Amazon, Google, and Netflix have 
demonstrated the value of these technologies by offering efficient and 
precise recommendations and doing sophisticated price 
discrimination. Other firms can use similar data to prevent fraud, 
predict users’ health needs, or anticipate (correctly or otherwise) their 
future behavior. The Big Data revolution ensures that this can be done 
in real time, on a large scale, and on a larger variety of information 
than ever before. As firms collect more data, store it more efficiently, 
and run algorithms on this data ever more effectively, the race for 
storing all sorts of customer (and non-customer) data is already on. 
Every visit to a website is now a race between advertisers to offer even 
more targeted ads. The ad networks, such as Google, Baidu, and 
Inmobi, auction the inventory in real time by inviting various 
advertisers to buy a spot. They, in turn, look up their database to 
calculate how “precisely” they can infer user intentions and bid on the 
spot to show the relevant ads. All these transactions happen in real 
time.  
 This ability to transact and monetize user attention is how 
Facebook and Yahoo! have become multi-billion dollar firms. The 
business model for a variety of firms depends partly or fully on their 
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ability to predict their users’ actions and offer personalized ads, 
products, and services. Mobile apps are another prime example where 
a majority of apps are ad supported. These apps have additional 
advantage of user location and mobility. Now the ads can be served 
based on where a user is located besides other network traces. 
Without the ability to monetize user information, it is unlikely that 
these app developers can bring in a variety of apps in the market.  
 Offering such products and services is not a new idea. the 
television and newspaper industries have been doing this for decades. 
The key difference is that these industries could (and even now) only 
show ads based on aggregate user characteristics or product types. For 
example, a sports channel might show more beer ads and a food 
network or a Wall Street Journal reader might be approached 
differently from a Pittsburgh Post-Gazette reader. Old media neither 
had an ability to monitor their users’ behavior, nor the technology to 
tailor ads on the fly. The Internet changed this, and Big Data has 
accelerated this trend. The ability to monitor users on the Internet 
highway in real time and to classify them into categories that might be 
considered privacy-invasive, while not assuring either the accuracy or 
security of the relevant data, has generated much angst amongst users 
and policy makers.   
 The use of Big Data is not just limited to targeting for 
advertisements. A more intricate issue has been on using these 
customer profiles for discrimination. There are valid concerns that 
employers, hospitals, or insurance firms could mine Big Data (public 
or private) and use that information to deny products and services. 
They may selectively offer some services to particular users. They may 
even discriminate in invidious ways based on information that is 
inaccurate or irrelevant. A recent European ruling on the right to be 
forgotten is based on the notion that users might be entitled to stop 
such personal information that may be used against them. 3 
 The two significant challenges for our society, which grow directly 
from the Big Data phenomenon and directly affect user security and 
privacy are as follows: 
1. Growth in Big Data is creating incentives for 
firms to collect and store even more data. 
Invariably, this has led and will continue to lead 
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to data breaches, data loss, and data security 
issues. Moreover, this has also led to data 
sharing issues among firms as well as between 
firms and the government.  
2. Growth in Big data is creating privacy 
challenges. Firms have incentives to mine 
customers’ data and intrude on their perceived 
privacy.  
In simplest terms, the question boils down to trading off the benefits 
to individuals, firms, and society, as we get better at collecting and 
analyzing large amounts of data in real time; versus the security and 
privacy threats the very same data and analysis impose. The goal of 
this article is not just to outline these tradeoffs, which are mostly 
obvious, but to discuss the variety of policy options and potential 
implications of those options and what might lie ahead. In this 
process, I will outline various stakeholders and their incentives and 
hope to bring in a more nuanced view to this discussion. The goal is 
not to advocate a particular policy but to highlight the rationales for 
different types of regulations and suggest their associated 
consequences.  
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 Let’s just start with the larger question of firms mining customer 
data to create behavioral profiles, predicting their next actions, and 
targeting them with products, services, and ads. In that process, they 
will undermine users’ perceived privacy.4 There is a clear transaction 
taking place. Users are parting with their data – though they may be 
doing it unknowingly – and in return they are getting products and 
services. In many cases, they are essentially getting free access to a 
product (Facebook networking or Google search, for example) or 
potentially cheaper products (for example, through Amazon or over a 
variety of mobile apps) because the relevant firms are able to monetize 
user information. So what is the friction? 
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 There are two issues. One, the firm may be excessively harvesting 
customer data. In short, even if the firm offers some benefit to end 
users, those benefits are significantly lower than what the firm gains 
from such harvesting. More importantly, in some cases, the harvesting 
leads to privacy loss for end users. Now this is not just rent seeking by 
the firms but a negative externality the firm imposes on users. These 
privacy losses cost users monetarily but do not necessarily affect the 
firms (at-least in the short run). The firm does not lose much (if 
anything at all) by harvesting this information compared to what the 
user might gain by targeted products and services, or from cheaper 
prices. In some cases, the user may lose significantly and would not 
have any recourse to get any compensation. This trade-off of customer 
data for firm value may be summed up in the following figure. 
 
 
 
Value  
to  
Firms 
 
 
 
 
 
The x-axis captures the cost to users due to firms mining their data. 
The y-axis captures the value to firms in collecting, analyzing, and 
mining this data. The left top quadrant (1) indicates that the potential 
value of data mining is large to the firms, but the privacy costs may 
not be too high. This is a potential win-win situation for all. An 
example might be data which is somewhat aggregated or anonymized 
but still very useful to the firm. The firm can still tailor its offerings, or 
make some predictions, but these cannot be traced back to an 
individual. The right lower quadrant (3) suggests that the potential 
value to the firm from mining this data is low but the cost to the user 
is potentially high. For example, many firms collect detailed user-
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specific data (sometimes for record keeping) but not use it for any 
productive purposes. Or, the marginal benefit to the firm of such 
information may be small. So, while firms may find it marginally 
beneficial to collect information, the loss of this information can be 
calamitous to users. Finally, the top right quadrant (2) poses the 
greatest challenge. While the privacy costs are high, the benefits to 
firms are large, too. Our challenge as a society is to find an acceptable 
balance. In particular, we do not want to be in the bottom right 
quadrant (3) and we want a balance when in quadrant (2). How do we 
accomplish this? 
 First, this schema is conceptual at best. While the trade-off seems 
intuitive, the costs and benefits of Big Data are not readily quantified 
in any quadrant, although, at an aggregate level, one might be able to 
measure the costs and benefits of such data harvesting. By “aggregate 
level,” I mean to include the costs and benefits across all four 
quadrants in the figure above. The questions to ask are: “How much 
does society (both firms and users) gain by harvesting this data?” and 
“How much do users lose due to their potential loss of privacy?” There 
are efforts already in the economics and marketing literature to 
measure the value of behavioral targeting.5 Generally, it is believed 
that users are more likely to click targeted ads, purchase when 
exposed to such ads, and are made better off through personalized 
products and recommendations. Firms or even governments may also 
be able to use Big Data to spot frauds or detect negative trends, (such 
as rising unemployment or outbreaks of disease), and take timely 
corrective actions. Of course, any account of benefits must recognize 
that many firms like Facebook might not even exist without their 
ability to mine data. Measuring the cost to users due to loss of privacy 
is much harder. Privacy entails more than the threat of monetary 
losses, but the moral and emotional components due to a perceived 
loss of control over private information is harder to quantify.  
 However, even if we were to measure these costs and benefits and 
conclude that notwithstanding some adverse privacy incidences, in 
aggregate, the benefits outweigh the costs, we still have a problem. 
The firm is still collecting and analyzing data from the bottom right 
quadrant (3) where user privacy costs are too high. We would prefer 
that firms stop those practices and stay on the top left quadrant (1) or 
possibly (2). In other words, aggregate measurements still do not 
solve the allocation problem. A second problem in this barter of user 
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data with products and services is that users are heterogeneous. Some 
users may value their privacy much more than others while some may 
value cheaper prices. In fact, a key stumbling block in privacy debates 
has always been that, unlike other commercial transactions, data 
transactions do not allow users to have any say. This lack of control, in 
my view, sums up the policymaker’s dilemma.   
 One blunt policy instrument would be to ban the harvesting of 
such information. But firms and society at large will be deprived of 
potential benefits that accrue from being in quadrant (1) or (2). Some 
users indeed may be willing to trade their information and in return 
gain some benefits. They will be shut out from executing this trade. 
Users would have privacy by default, and it would be up to the users to 
find ways to trade their information in exchange for personalized 
products or services. The other extreme would be to allow firms full 
freedom to harvest this information and give users a chance to “buy” 
privacy. The default would be “no privacy,” but users could pay to get 
their privacy back.  
 On the face of it, both options are sub-optimal unless we firmly 
believe (a) that any sort of data mining and targeting is socially 
detrimental and should be banned, or (b) that privacy is a 
fundamental right that cannot (and should not) be breached even if 
leads to potential benefits. Otherwise, we need a policy or other 
mechanism that allows for heterogeneous privacy provision and more 
efficient allocation.  
 In the U.S., the hope is usually that the market mechanism will 
achieve this goal. This is especially true for firms directly dealing with 
end users. In fact, we expect that, in a competitive market, firms 
should be willing to limit data harvesting, at least with regard to data 
of high value to customers, but little value to firms. And, if a user 
demands more privacy, then firms should be willing to provide it. But 
for the competition to work, market power cannot be concentrated 
within a small number of firms. More importantly, users need to be 
informed about firms’ data usage policies and need to have some 
control over how their data might be used. Much of the U.S. policy 
making thus has focused on transparency and disclosure. The 
legislative efforts and recommendations (for example, the FTC’s 
privacy report6 or the White House report on Big Data7) have focused 
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primarily on forcing firms to disclose their practices so users can make 
informed choices leading to more competitive markets.  
 Optimally, we would like the firms to move from quadrant (3) to 
(1). It remains to be seen, in the medium or long run, if markets alone 
can deliver such move. Critics already argue that markets have failed 
and have no chance of working. Technology is progressing too fast, 
and firms are finding more ways to intrude on user privacy faster than 
markets can ever adjust. Anecdotal evidence, however, probably 
paints a less pessimistic picture. Some of the larger firms that directly 
transact with users have been responding to user concerns more 
aggressively. Media, Congress, and government regulatory bodies are 
increasingly paying attention. Google, Microsoft, and Facebook all 
display some responsiveness to user concerns. There is some evidence 
that firms are also taking steps to define their data use policies more 
clearly, drawing boundaries between various data, storing data less 
and for shorter periods, and giving users more choices.8 Recently, for 
example, Facebook announced that it will let users know “why” they 
are being shown a particular advertisement.9 Thus, users would have 
access to information that is being collected and used in targeting 
them. In turn, they would also have access to potentially disallow or 
limit the harvesting of their data. This goes back to my earlier point. A 
well-functioning market will promote efficient allocation. We still 
have to wait and see whether the momentum for market 
responsiveness continues; at least for consumers dealing with large 
reputable firms, there is reason for optimism. It is likely that firms will 
move away from quadrant (3) to hopefully quadrant (1) and possibly 
(2). In short, the hope is that the firms will stop harvesting excessive 
personal data.  Of course, this still does put the onus on users. It is 
probably fair to say that some users will still face significant cognitive 
hurdles in controlling their data even if more options are made 
available to them.  
                                                                                                                   
7  Executive Office of the President. "Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values," 
The White House, last modified May, 2014, http:// www.whitehouse.gov/ 
sites/default/files/docs/ big_data_privacy_report_5.1.14_final_print.pdf. 
8 “How You Can Stay Safe and Secure Online,” Google.com, last accessed October 9, 2014,  
https://www.google.com/intl/en-US/goodtoknow/online-safety. Elinor Mills, “Search 
engines race to update privacy policies,” CNET News, July 22, 2007, 
http://news.cnet.com/Search-engines-race-to-update-privacy-policies/2100-1030_3-
6198053.html. 
9 Keith Wagstaff, “Facebook Lets Users Opt Out of Targeted Ads,” NBC News, June 12, 
2014, http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/facebook-lets-users-opt-out-targeted-
ads-n129566. 
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 There is another element to the market mechanism which is often 
overlooked. As firms increasingly deploy technology to intrude upon 
users and collect user data, there are a growing number of middleware 
firms that are developing technologies to protect privacy. Many 
products are available in the market – from browsers, to encryption 
tools, to even our computers and handheld devices – that allow users 
to “buy” or “protect” their privacy (popularly known as “privacy 
enhancing technologies” or PET).10 Increasingly, these products will 
either be available for free or at low costs and may even be embedded 
in our standard software (browsers, emails and operating systems). 
There also are services like “Trusted ID” that promise to protect user 
data for a price. This is somewhat akin to a market where privacy 
becomes a luxury good and people with resources (both education and 
money) can afford to reduce privacy infringement. Economically, it 
may be efficient in that users who have a higher preference for privacy 
are able to get it.  Socially, it may be unfair. It may put what is still an 
undue burden on users to protect their privacy.  
 However, a combination of proliferating PET products and 
services, plus firms responding more robustly to user concerns, offers 
a hope for an equilibrium where firms and users can co-exist without 
policy makers putting strong restrictions on data use. Of course, this 
would require that firms provide an option for users to limit their data 
collection. There is fair bit of agreement that transparency will and 
should be the cornerstone of a reasonable policy in this space – and 
that users will be educated enough to deploy some of the PET to limit 
their exposure should they so choose. Thus, some users will be able to 
prevent firms from using their information and be willing to forfeit 
potential benefits. In short, even if we are in quadrant (2), there is a 
possibility of efficient allocation where users who value privacy more 
than the potential benefits of information sharing will be able to 
exercise that option.  
 Markets are much less likely to work when dealing with firms that 
do not face users directly. An example would be third party data 
brokers. There are a large number of such data brokers such as 
Acxicom, or Datalogix. These firms collect data about users from 
various sources. They gather it from participating clients, such as 
retailers, insurance firms, and web crawlers, from public data, such as 
social media and public web sites, and from government records, such 
as court proceedings and tax records, to create customer profiles 
which they sell to various clients who are interested in learning about 
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potential customers. Client firms use this data mostly for marketing 
purposes. But in other cases, this data is also potentially used to make 
decisions regarding employment, insurance, and other sensitive 
purposes. Sometimes, the information can be highly privacy invasive 
even if used only for marketing purposes -- for example, sending 
unsolicited flyers on erectile dysfunction. Because data brokers do not 
transact directly with consumers, consumers have little or no leverage. 
Unlike the consumer-facing firms like Facebook or Google or even 
regular retailers who have to respond to consumer concerns and 
media pressure more directly, the data brokers do not face direct 
scrutiny with end users. Even though there are many data brokers, the 
precise role of competition is unclear. Since many users will not even 
recognize these firms, it is hard to imagine that competition from the 
user side will force any action. Even the client firms are probably not 
likely to be overly concerned about the accuracy or security of data 
brokers’ data beyond a threshold. After all, the cost of inaccuracy or 
data breach or privacy invasion will be borne mostly by end users and 
not by the client firms.  
 In my view, the markets are less likely to be effective when it 
comes to third party data brokers. Even forcing some transparency 
(which the FTC has been recommending) may prove insufficient 
because most users do not directly deal with these firms. 
Transparency would require the brokers to let users review their 
information or even potentially opt-out. While these may be 
reasonably effective strategies when it comes to firms like Facebook, it 
is not clear if they will work for data brokers. Except for very attentive 
users, it is unlikely that average users can discern their privacy options 
and take appropriate action at these sites. Thus, it is not entirely clear 
that markets can readily discipline the data brokers from excessively 
harvesting data. In fact, it is likely that, without direct regulations, the 
data brokers might be content to sit in quadrant (3), which is clearly 
sub-optimal socially.  
 As noted above, Big Data can readily be used as the basis for 
discrimination. Firms may be able to predict a user’s sexual 
preferences, her medical history, or her political views and, on some 
such basis, discriminate in providing jobs, housing, or even particular 
products, such as insurance.  Discrimination, of course, has always 
existed in some form. Discriminatory practices persist despite the 
many laws on books that outlaw them. However, with Big Data, both 
the existence of discrimination and the underlying reasons for 
discrimination might be especially hidden from users and 
policymakers.  Many users may disclose their political views or sexual 
orientation on the Internet. Algorithmic predictions about a user’s 
sexual preference might deny her employment and the user might 
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never know what was the cause. Markets are much less likely to be 
helpful in overcoming such covert discrimination.  
 Although researchers have done an excellent job in highlighting 
the possibility of potential discrimination -- for example, an Oxford 
study shows how user preferences can be identified from “likes” on 
Facebook.11 – There is little empirical work to suggest that firms 
actively pursue invidious discrimination, on a large scale, based on Big 
Data.  We can perhaps be optimistic that data-driven discrimination 
of this kind will not be widespread. The potential public fallout (and 
legal liability) facing a firm discovered to have carried on such 
practices would be substantial. Discrimination is likely to remain a 
significant policy challenge for policymakers because, to the extent it 
exists, it is unlikely to be overcome by market-based mechanisms 
alone, and it potentially serves as a significant justification for strong 
restrictions on data use (even if we have to forfeit potential benefits).  
 Besides privacy, the other major policy issues provoked by Big 
Data relates to Information Security. With firms collecting and storing 
large volume of data, the security of this data becomes imperative. The 
data can be hacked, breached, or lost due to negligence. Data loss can 
lead to credit card misuse, identify theft, or other types of financial 
fraud for users. At least one foundational premise for public policy on 
data security is somewhat settled, however, namely, there is general 
agreement that firms need to bear some responsibility for data 
security and data breaches. Data breach notification laws passed by 
various states have become a default regulatory device. Firms have to 
inform users when they lose their data (at least if the breach reaches a 
certain threshold). Firms also have to provide some remediation 
services in cases of potential harm. The FTC can penalize firms for 
unfair or deceptive trade practices in connection with data breaches. 
Moreover, recent efforts by the SEC to encourage firms to disclose 
cybersecurity risks in their annual reports is an example of using 
transparency to encourage responsible firm behavior.  
 No one has actually assessed the effectiveness of these regulations 
in any definitive way, but the notification laws are here to stay. 12 The 
only question is whether, instead of state-specific laws, an overarching 
federal law for breach notification would work better. Many firms 
might prefer federal regulation as opposed to compliance with dozens 
of differing state regulatory regimes. Unfortunately, breach 
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notification laws cannot protect users completely. Hacking losses may 
occur much later than a breach, and users would probably find it hard 
to prove that a firm suffering a breach was directly responsible for a 
particular user loss.  
 Many of the data breaches involve the misuse of credit debit cards. 
Here, the user is somewhat better protected as banks or credit card 
issuers generally bear the losses. In fact, the imposition of this liability 
on banks and large credit card firms (Visa, American Express and 
MasterCard) has led to the Personal Card Industry (“PCI”) security 
standards. PCI is a set of industry developed standards with which 
most retailers who handle customer cards have to comply. In short, 
Big Data security has become a private firm issue, though some 
significant some policy challenges do remain.13 The policy judgments 
embodied in forced transparency and remediation through data 
breach notification laws has encouraged significant self-regulation by 
the industry.  
 The privacy policy issues attending consumer data are more fluid. 
Some hope that market forces will force the firms to move away from 
quadrant (3). However, the situation in quadrant (2) – where 
information is both valuable to firms, but sensitive for users -- is likely 
to remain vexing. For any regulation to be sensible, policymakers 
must be able to measure some defined outcomes, measure deviances 
of firms from these outcomes, and define appropriate punishment. 
Generally, regulations proceed in two ways. Either we define some 
rules “ex ante,” or we penalize firms “ex post” (after the incidence).  
Most industries confront a combination of both. For example, car 
manufacturers have to comply with a variety of ex ante standards and 
safety requirements, but also are held liable should their negligence in 
manufacturing lead to actual injuries after purchase.  
 In the case of data privacy, firms that mine privacy-sensitive end 
user data for profit, even when beneficial to users, impose a negative 
externality on the market. Privacy intrusion carries a cost that only 
end users bear, but are not compensated for it.  A standard answer to 
such an externality is a Pigovian tax.14 Unfortunately, measuring the 
extent of privacy violations on a case-by-case basis is very difficult for 
both firms and users, and would entail large transaction costs.  Even if 
users feel violated by a firm’s practices, it will virtually be impossible 
to (i) prove that there is indeed a violation of law, and (ii) quantify the 
harm to the end user. Proof is complicated by the fact the end users 
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14 “Pigovian tax,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org 
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may not even notice for a time that their data is being misused. 
Quantification is yet more complex because different users will have 
different tolerances for privacy intrusion. Yet, unless regulators can 
clearly define some measurable and quantifiable violations, ex post 
rules will be hard to implement. Due to this uncertainty, privacy 
advocates prefer a significant ex ante restriction in broad data 
collection and data use rather than allowing for nuanced 
heterogeneity and ex post punishments.  
 Given the difficulty in defining ex post rules, regulators have 
naturally gravitated towards ex ante rules that rely on compliance. 
Many of the consent and notice rules follow this rationale. Firms are 
expected to provide details of their data use to end users, clearly 
define their policies, and get user consent before firms can use user 
data. For example, HIPAA and other laws in the health care industry 
are geared towards consent. Within a broad definition of compliance, 
some rules can be stricter than others. For example, there is always a 
big debate on “opt-in” versus “opt-out” policies. By default, most firms 
would prefer a default user opt-in to their data collection and use 
agreements, while privacy advocates would prefer an opt-out default 
that would require affirmative user consent to enable a firm’s data 
access. Due to user inertia, there are major differences in outcomes 
when opt-in is a default versus opt-out.  
  In short, much of the policy-making is focused on ex ante 
compliance-based rules. Of course, in cases of egregious privacy 
violations, users and policymakers can always go for ex post liability, 
but, for all the reasons stated, the overall policy push has been on ex 
ante compliance and transparency.  
III. REGULATIONS AND INNOVATION 
 One the biggest objections to regulation is that it will hurt 
innovative activities in the economy. Many firms offer innovative 
products and services based on Big Data analysis. Many of these firms 
are small businesses, and strict compliance requirements or the threat 
of crushing liability could make these firms unviable.  
 The role of regulation, though, is quite nuanced. In some cases, 
regulatory compliance itself requires innovation. For example, in the 
case of automobiles, forcing vehicles to comply with better fuel 
mileage led to innovation ultimately benefitting firms, as well as 
consumers. It is possible that a regulation banning certain uses of 
personal data might lead to firms innovating in ways that enable 
similar products and services to be offered based more on aggregate 
data that is less privacy intrusive, or for firms to innovate on privacy 
enhancing technologies which simultaneously allow data use.  
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 In other cases, however, regulations place compliance burdens on 
firms that force them to divert time and money from innovative 
activities to compliance efforts. A breach notification law requires 
firms to notify users; reissue credit cards, if needed; and provide other 
services—all of which could entail substantial effort and expense. Such 
burdens may be even more acute for small firms.  
 The type of innovation is also relevant to consider. Some, perhaps 
most, innovations are marginal. It is believed that regulatory 
compliance generally leads to marginal innovations.15 Other 
innovations are more radical, leading to new products and services 
that not only replace the existing ones, but which can also be hugely 
beneficial to society at large. Big Data has the potential to generate 
both radical, as well as incremental innovations. Many firms and 
businesses may be able to harness Big Data, not only to make their 
existing lines of business more efficient and productive, but also to 
usher in more far-reaching improvements. A significant restriction on 
data use could adversely affect the revenue potential for both large 
(Google, for example) and small firms, robbing them of the ability to 
invest in those innovative activities that go beyond merely marginal 
improvement.  
 An often overlooked negative consequence of regulation is 
deterrence to market entry. Smaller firms are less likely to enter into 
markets operating with stringent regulatory environments. Thus, 
regulations may impede competition and reduce market effectiveness. 
These issues are particularly salient in fluid markets like mobile apps 
which are dominated by small app developers.  
 Stewart provides a comprehensive literature review of the effects 
of regulation on innovative activities in various industries like 
manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, and telecommunications. His review 
shows that regulations that do not require innovation for compliance 
stifle innovations. Even when they require innovation for compliance, 
their impact on innovation is marginal at best. However, regulatory 
design can play an important role in determining economic impact. 
Regulations that are incentive-based and rely on performance 
standards tend to perform the best. Regulations that allow industry 
and markets to find a path to implementation are also most effective 
in spurring innovations. An analogy in this space might be to allow 
firms to innovate on privacy-preserving algorithms which would allow 
them to use user data to a degree. Government agencies in particular 
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have incentives to release data to the public, and better technology 
innovation in the privacy-preserving domain would lead to better 
dissemination of such data.   
 Unfortunately, the debate on the potential tradeoffs between 
regulation and innovation in the space of Big Data and privacy lacks 
any significant empirical foundation. It is to be expected. We are still 
in the nascent stages of a large phenomenon. Some work by Goldfarb 
and Tucker 16 suggests that firms’ ability to target individuals plays an 
important role in effectiveness of the ads. So if the information use is 
restricted, the ability to target and monetize will decline sharply. An 
ECRI study (2003)17 suggests that wide sharing of credit reports in the 
US leads to broader access to credit in the US relative to the European 
countries. Thus, more restrictions to data sharing have deleterious 
effects. However, it will take a while to gather large scale scientific 
evidence that provides clear pointers to better policy. 
 However, an undesirable consequence of our continued 
disagreement on a policy roadmap is that it creates an environment of 
uncertainty. When firms are unsure of what the next policy regulation 
will be, they are less willing to invest. The same is probably true for 
consumers. At least a subset of consumers could become wary of 
Internet and mobile platforms and refuse to adopt those platforms 
even though their participation would carry social, as well as private, 
benefits. This is pointed out by Stewart (2010) and by a study by Idris 
et al.18 Idris et al finds that, in the context of health information 
exchanges (“HIE”), states with clearly defined privacy policies (even if 
they are more strict) are more likely to see investments in HIE than 
states with undefined policies.  
 In conclusion, the Big Data phenomenon has generated strong 
opinions on what policymakers should and should not do. Many 
prefer strong restrictions on data use and still penalties for privacy 
violations. Others prefer a more market-based approach. In this 
article, I have tried to outline the conditions where market-based 
approaches might work better and where we need a stronger public 
policy push. I feel cautiously optimistic that, in markets where users 
deal directly with firms, market-based mechanisms with reasonable ex 
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ante compliance rules will work effectively in the medium-to-long run. 
On the other hand, when firms are only indirectly responsible for user 
data, I feel less optimistic and expect that public policy will need to 
play a stronger role. Finally, we have opportunities for smarter 
regulations which are more incentive-based and allow more freedom 
to firms and markets for implementation. Eventually, we need more 
data and research to assess the effectiveness of existing policies and 
chart a smarter course for the future.   
 
 
 
